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IN Tl I[~ Sl'PREME COURT or THE ST1\TE OF UTMJ 
-----------------------------------------------
fl.\ NIEL iv!. SC:lf\V,\ RTZ, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 14832 and 14844 
M. D. HALTOM and MICHAELS. 
T~NNER, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT MICHAELS. TANNER 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Judgment entered against the defendant-
appellant Michael S. Tanner entered on the 20th day of September, 1976 in 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
after a trial before che Judge, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwi11 Jr. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A Judgment was entered against the defendant-appellant for the 
sum of S40, 643. 00 as damages and the sum of $7, 500. 00 as attorney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks an Order of this Court reversing the Judgment 
and Findings entered b\' the Trial Court and awarding the appellant his costs 
incu1·r"d · 1 ·. . ' Ill t 11,.; '1l'll0ll. 
- I -
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STATEMENT OF L\CTS 
The plaintiffs Daniel iv!. Schwartz and Bernice L. Schwanz were 
owners of a house located at 1792 Millbrook Road, Salt Lake Countv, Stme 
of Utah, which was listed for sale beginning in 1966 when the plaimiffs left 
the State of Utah and established residence in California. (T. 14) 
Mr. and Mrs. Schwartz had authorized their attorney in Salt Lake 
City, plaintiff Alvin I. Smith, to receive offers for purchase of the house 
and relay them to California. (T. 100) 
Sometime in November of 1968, the defendant, Stan Tanner, defen-
dant, Earl ]. Knudson, a real estate broker and defendant M. n. Haltom, 
contacted Mr. Smith at his office in Salt Lake City, Utah. (T. 102) Mr. 
Haltom indicated that he represented the defendant Stan Tanner, a resident 
of Phoenix, Arizona (T. 102) and said that Stan Tanner wanted to purchase 
the plaintiffs house in Salt Lake City, which he was going to give to his son, 
the appellant Michael S. Tanner. (T. 104) Mr. Haltom said anv offer from 
Stan Tanner was conditioned upon the sale of the house to Stan Tinner, free 
and clear of any mortgage. At this meeting, M. D. Haltom discussed with 
Mr. Smith (T. 112) the possible means of collateralizing the proposed purchaEC 
of the property and made some statements regarding Stan Tanner's holding in 
the stock of several corporations. (T. 104 to T. 112). 
On JRcember 8, 1968, lliniel Schwartz met for a period of two 
1 - S l' ci cco Califor-hours personally with the defendant, M. D. Ha tom in an -ran u ' , 
.. ec:cnt\?l! 
nia. (T. 15) At this meeting, Mr. Haltom agJ.in indicated that he: 1 epr · 
-2-
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L 
Stan Tanner who wanted to purchase a house in Salt Lake City, which he was 
going to give free anu clear to Michael Tanner to induce the appellant to 
come to l 1tah from his residence in Phoenix, Arizona to operate a business 
in Salt Lake Citv in which Stan Tanner had an interest. (T. 16) Mr. Haltom 
made an offer on behalf of Stan Tanner to purchase the house for $47, 000. 00 
the price at which it was listed. (T. 17) The balance of the purchase price, 
after payment of an outstanding mortgage of $3, 000. 00 was to be paid by a 
personal note executed by Stan Tanner. (T. 17) Mr. Haltom also stated that 
as security for the note, Stan Tanner would pledge certain stock in Bishop 
Industries Incorporated and other stock. (T. 18) During this meeting, Mr. 
Haltom made several statements and representations about the above-men-
tioned corporation and several other companies, United Equities Company 
and Western States Land of Utah. (T. 18 to 24). At no point in this conversa-
tion did Mr. Haltom indicate that he was representing the appellant or that 
the appellant was a party to Stan Tanner's purchase of the plaintiffs property. 
(T. 63) The plaintiff stated at the trial that at this time he did not request any 
collateral from the appellant nor asked that the appellant sign the note. (T. 
62, 63 ). 
On January 2, 1969, Stan Tanner personally executed and delivered 
to the plaintiffs a Promissory Note in the principal amount of $40, 643. 00 
With interest and this note was secured by a pledge of 10, 000 shares of the 
common stock of Bishop Industries, Inc. and 20, 000 shares of the common 
stock of Western States Land of Utah. (Exhibit 5-D) Contemporaneously, the 
plaintiffs, Daniel and Bernice Schwartz executed a Warranty Deed in favor 
-3-
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plaintiff. (T. 154) He testified that in November of 1968, he CJ.me co Salt 
Lake City to look for homes suitable for his family after his father, Stan 
Tanner had offered to purchase for him a home to induce him to live in Salt 
Lake City and to take a position with his father's organization (T. 166, 16i). 
The appellant, at this time, selected three houses, one of which was the houi: 
owned by the plaintiffs (T. 168 ). The appellant testified that he did not know 1 
the details surrounding the acquisition of the home by Stan Tanner or that 
I 
stock was involved in the purchase of the house prior to the time the house ha: 
been purchased (T. 169). He testified that prior to the closing on the plaintiff: 
! 
house in January, 1969, he had never seen any of the documents or agreemenr' i 
used in the closing (T. 183 ). He stated that prior to the closing he did not 
have any detailed conversations with either Mr. Haltom or Stan Tanner (T. IS'. 1 
On February 20, 1969, the real property at issue was mortgage<lb1 
the appellant (T. 172 and Exhibit 17-P). The funds obtained bv the mongage 
went to Jennifer Day Enterprises, a Nevada corporation in which Stan Tann21' 
had an interest (T. 161, 173 ). The appellant lived in the house for a period 
of approximately one year at which time he moved out to find a more suitable ' 
residence (T. 181 ). 
The note signed by Stan Tanner was unpaid at the time of trial in 
the amount of $40, 643. 00. ( R. 7 6) 
l · 'ffc J)lniel The trial court entered judgment in favor of the p arntt ~ 
, \[ I) 1 JJ]Wi11 M. Schwartz and Bernice L. Schwartz agGinst the dcfc:nclcint~. · · -· 
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Stan Tanner, anJ i\'lichael Tanner for S.fO, 6-!3. 00 and S7, 500. 00 for attornev' s 
fees (R. 80). The Court also awarded damages against Stan Tanner for 
S21, 870. 29 for interest on the aforementioned note ( R. 80). 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AT 
TRIAL DOES NOT SUSTAIN THE LOWER COURTS FIND-
ING OF APPELLANTS INVOLVEMENT IN A CONSPIRACY 
The Trial Court in the Findings of Fact entered in this action based 
the liability of the appellant Michael Tanner upon his involvement as a con-
spirator in a plan to defraud the plaintiffs. The trial court found in Paragraph 
S of the Findings of Fact that the appellant had acted at all times in concert 
with M. D. Haltom and Stan Tanner in a scheme and plan to defraud the plain-
tiffs (R. 70). While not making any specific finding as to the knowledge or 
extent of involvement of the appellant, the Court stated in Paragraph 12 of the 
Findings of Fact that M. D. Haltom "acting on his own behalf and in conspiracy 
with the defendants, MICHA EL S. TANNER and ST AN TANNER, willfully made 
misrepresentations of material facts and willfully omitted to state facts . 
(R. 74) 
In the case of Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d. 83, 368 P. 2d 597 (1962) 
the plaintiffs sought to establish liability on the basis of conspiracy to cause 
a breach of contract. The court held that no conspiracy had been proven be-
cause the evidence had not shown that the parties were engaged in a concerted 
action to cause the breach of contract, nor did the evidence show that such 
action was, in fact, done for the group or part of a plan. The court cited as 
authorit1 for this proposition the case of Teamsters. Chauffc:rs & Helpers 
~!_ lmc:rka. r oc:ll :222 v. Board of Review, Depanment of [mplovment Security, 
-5-
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10 Utah 2J 63, 348 P. 2d ,')88 ( 1960). In the Teamsters cosc. the Coun StJt, 
the general proposition that there is no basis for holJing a "roup of p 'f' " 
<=- ~ oOn, 
responsible for the acts of one unless it is affirmativelv established that the 
group is engaged in a concerted activitv and that the action of one is. in fact. 
done for the group as part of a plan. 
Because the plaintiffs alleged that there existed a conspiracv to 
defraud, the burden to prove the existence of such conspiracy is even greater 
than most other civil cases. In Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of J\merici. 
17 Utah 2d 339, 405, states the general rule that fraud must be proven bv 
the plaintiff by clear and convincing evidence and that a cause of action will 
not lie in mere suspicion or innuerido raised by the relationship of two partie;, 
See also, Tanner v. Pillsbury Mills, 3 Utah 2d 196, 281 P. 2d 391 ( 1955) 
and Harris v. Capital Records, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539, 413 P. 2d 139 (1966). 
In this case, no evidence was presented by anv of the four witnesse: 
produced by the plaintiff that the appellant was involved in a conspiracv, schrn 
or plan to defraud the plaintiffs. Daniel Schwartz stated that to his knowledge 
at the time Mr. Haltom made the representations on behalf of Stan Tanner. 
the appellant was "only going to move into the house." (T. 63) The fact that 
the appellant may have benefited by the agreement made between Stan Tanner 
and the plaintiffs does not make the appellant liable on the basis of the actions 
of Stan Tanner. Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, supra, and 
5 7 Am Jur 2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 305, (1969 ). The fact that the appellant 
received the benefit of the property would at most make him liable in a cau~c 
of action based on unjust enrichment. 
-6-
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The second witness produced by the plaintiff, 1\ttornev r\lvin 1. 
Smith, admitted that prior to the closing of the agreement to purchase the 
house, he did not know the appellant personally and that he had not had any 
discussions with the appellant (T. 148 ). He testified that as far as he knew 
the appellants only involvement other than signing the deed with his wife occurred 
on May 1, 1969, five months after Stan Tanner and the plaintiffs had negotiated 
the sale, when the appellant delivered a cashier's check to his office for a 
pavment to the plaintiff on the home in which he was living (T. 150). 
When called by the plaintiff on direct, the appellant stated that he 
did not discuss the matter in detail with Stan Tanner and did not discuss, or 
even see, any of the documents or agreements involved in this case prior to 
the closing of the house in January of 1969 (T. 183). 
The fourth witness called on behalf of the plaintiffs was Earl J. 
Knudson, a real estate agent and an officer of Western States Land of Utah 
(T. 184). He did not testify to any fact which supported the plaintiffs claim 
that the appellant was involved in a conspiracy. 
The appellant submits that the trial court was in error in finding 
that a conspiracy to defraud was proven by clear and convincing evidence and 
that the appellant was an active participant in a conspiracy. Therefore, the 
finding of a cause of action against the appellant should be reversed and the 
appellant awarded his costs in bringing the action. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF Ft\ILED TO PROVE ALL OF TllE ELE-
MENTS OF COMMON LA \V FRAUD IN RELATIONSHIP 
TO Tl-TE ,\PPELL\NT 
-;-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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The plaintiff had the burden to establish all of the elem<.::nts of a 
cause of action of fraud, as set forth in Pace v. Parrish, 122 L1tah 141, 247 
P. 2d 273 (1952), which are: 
1. That a representation was made: 
2. Concerning a presently existing material fact: 
3. Which was false; 
4. Which the representor either 
(a). knew to be false, or 
(b ). made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
5. For the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it: 
6. That the other party, acting reasonably and in belief of its 
falsity; 
7. Did in fact rely upon it; 
8. And was thereby induced to act; 
9. To his injury and damage. 
The plaintiff had the burden of proving each and every element b1 
clear and convincing evidence and could not rely on mere suspicion or innu1r,.
1 which may have been present because of the appellant's relationship to Stan 
Tanner. Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 40i 
P. 2d 339 (1965) and Bezner v. Continental Ory Cleaners, Inc. 548 P. 2d 
898 (Utah 1976). 
After trial, the counsel for the appellant made a motion for a i 
ct~ tint rhcr I directed verdict or in the alternative for a new trial, on the' groun ~ ' · 
-8-
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was not :oufficicnt evidence to sustain a judgment of fraud against the defen-
dant, \1ichael S. Tanner. 
The appellant submits that th2 evidence presented to the trial court 
does not sustain the lower courts finding of liability against the appellant on 
the basis of common law fraud under the standard of clear and convincing 
evidence. 
The representations made by Stan Tanner concerning the stock were 
secondarv and not material to the sale of the house. The plaintiffs' house was 
sold to Stan Tanner by plaintiffs for the consideration of a personal note of 
Sto.n Tanner (T. 92). The primary obligation was the note which was second-
aril\' secured by the stock as collateral. (T. 66). 
As to Michael Tanner, the plaintiff had the burden of showing that 
he actually had a preconceived knowledge prior to the time the representations 
were made to the plaintiffs that the representations made by M. D. !Taltom 
were false, were known by M. D. Haltom to be false, and were made by M. 
D. Haltom to induce the plaintiffs to act upon the representations. Ellis v. 
Hale, 13 l 1tah 2d 279, 373 P. 2d 382 (1962), Marks v. Continental Casualtv Co., 
19 Utah 2d 119, 427 P. 2d 387 (1967), Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 
supra. The record does not reflect any evidence or even any circumstantial 
evidence that the appellant had any such presently existing knowledge. 
Therefore, the appellant submits the cause of action against the 
appellant should be reversed and the appellant awarded his costs because there 
is insufficient evidence as to the appellant to support the trial courts finding 
I of a]] of the el..:rnents of fraud. 
-9-
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POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFS F r\ILED TO EXERCISE DL1E C: 1\RE 
IN THEIR BUSINESS DEA LINGS WIT!I ST AN T,\NNER 
The plaintiff, Daniel Schwartz, was under a dutv to exercise 
reasonable care and prudence before entering into an "arms -length" busint: 
transaction. Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P. 2d 865 (1954). 1 ~ 
v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P. 2d 659, (1967). If the 
,. 
plaintiff did fail to exercise reasonable care, then under the rule as stated ir 
the foregoing cases, the plaintiff failed to prove that he reasonabl v relieJ on 
the representations and the plaintiff could not recover in this action. 
In the present case, the plaintiff had the opportunity and abilit1 to 
independently verify and substantiate the value of the stock being offered as 
security for the note (T. 65 ). At trial he stated that he contacted a broker 
in New York concerning the stock (T. 65), and a banker (T. 67). The plainrit 
did not have a credit of Stan Tanner the person signing the note (T. 67). At: 
the December 8, 1968 meeting and until the January 1969 closing the plaintiff 
had the opportunity and ability to investigate the representations and determin 
whether or not he should rely on the information communicated to him in the 
two-hour meeting with M. D. Haltom concerning the stock of Stan Tanner. 
Further-more, the plaintiff was represented by legal counsel, 
Alvin I. Smith, who had previously known Mr. Stan Tanner and told the plainrr: 
that the stock was speculative stock (T. 146). The plaintiff relied on the 
• " • r c(O'ations 
representations of Mr. Smith, who had personally maJc some inie- 10 
of Bishop Industries stock and who had personally purchaseJ some of the 
-10-
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stock in cilL' same period of time (T. 148). 
The appellant submits that in the light of the foregoing the decisions 
of the trial court should be reversed beco.use the plaintiff was not entitled to 
reasonably relv on the representations made by M. D. Haltom on behalf of 
Stan Tanner in selling the property and, therefore, the judgment should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On the basis of the foregoing points, the appellant submits the con-
clusion judgment entered by the lower court should be reversed and the 
appellant awarded his costs in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-11-
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HEC:EWT 
I do hcTL'bv acknowledge receipr of dcvcn ( 11) copies of the 
foregoing brief in the abovc-sryled case of l);rnicl M. Schwartz, Plaintiff 
and Respondent vs M. D. IJaltom and Michael S. Tanner, Defendant and 
Appellants, this 22nd day of April, 1977. 
UTA If SUPREME COUHT 
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